The LASERFAX ITS Issue

History:				20/(1
When it was o	generally app	eciated that	(Fa.	-2 5X1
	would find th	e Intelligence	Community	
with no means for	r rapid transm	aission of	- N	
crisis related	d preliminary	read out image	ry the DDI	
took a hand in ex	kamining this	question. Thi	s resulted	
in the LASERFAX p DDI and the DDS&T	proposal being	approved join	tly by the	25X1
the IC Staff he s	subsequently d	lecided that th	is proposal	_
should be a Commu	inity answer t	o the lack of	a	[_] 25X1
rapid system. In	i his letter l	ast spring he	so informed	20/(1
the Community. N				
changed since the				
in his various re	cent papers o	n the subject.	He has	
effectively refut	ed the "fewer	" stations cas	e in the Hal	.1
letter of August	and the more	recent "techni	cal" objecti	ons
by			-	

In my view the question goes beyond the objective situation and cuts to the heart of the DCI--the concept and viability of the role in the first instance and his ability and/or willingness to stand by his decisions in the second. The issue is therefore heavily political and must be addressed in large part in those terms.

The Specific Issues:

Within the context of the political nature of the issue the following are specific points that also must be addressed:

--is the difference in cost between ten and four stations significant enough to leave out State, the White House and NSA, with all the inherent political overtones this could raise?

--can we in the intelligence business risk a grossly reduced system, or another system which will not be ready until after IOC or as I suspect some wish, no system at all given how our masters ILLEGIB

25X1

25X1

in the Executive and/or Legislative branches might react upon learning that we spent X millions on a near real time imagery system, bringing us imagery in under two hours but were satisfied with a local courier delivery system that can take that long to get the imagery from the ground site to the customer?

--given an emasculation or abolition of an ITS now, could we risk a DCI attending a hastily called WSAG without time to wait for the courier only to find when he arrives at the meeting that his military compatriots had the imagery because they were able to arrange for helicopter delivery?

--granting some validity of the ASD(I) arguments, are the cost/risk factors in balance?

--what effect will no imagery transmission system or a sharply reduced one have on the various analysts in the Community? Will it not have a polarizing effect if some key players are left out or if different organizations are left to their own devices and arrange for different delivery systems getting the "NRT" product to different analysts hours apart?

Quo Vadis?

This could be a flood gate issue if the DCI goes back on his earlier decision and accedes to ASD(I) wishes. It could also erode confidence in the IC Staff's role since under vigorous leadership they took the DDI/DDS&T proposal and made it a Community answer to a serious vacuum.

Lastly it could place production analysts and crisis managers in an unpleasant "Johnny at the rat hole" situation—the organization with its own best method of getting the first piece of imagery trying to look good at the expense of the others. And we do not have helicopters.

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October 9, 1975

NOTE FOR: ADDI

Dear Paul,

The attached is the general strategy I intend to follow at today's meeting with Knoche et al.

Vincent J. Heyman Chief, CIA Operations Center

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Hank Knoche hastily conveyed a meeting to discuss LASERFAX. With no obvious DDI rep at hand, I concurred in SSGs suggestion that Vince should attend.

Here are notes he prepared in advance of the meeting.

Date 9 October 1975

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